Legal
Jetflow Technology Limited is the data user for the personal data described here, under the Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance. This notice says exactly what a request leaves behind, how long it stays, and what you can ask us to do about it.
For your account: your email address, an Argon2id hash of your password (never the password), your organisation name if you gave one, and your verification state. For your keys: a label, a prefix, the SHA-256 hash of the key, and the policy you set on it. A key is a 256-bit random secret we generate, so hashing it is enough; a password is human-chosen, which is why it gets a memory-hard hash instead.
For billing: the append-only ledger, and — if you pay by card — the customer and payment identifiers Stripe gives us. Card numbers never reach our servers; Stripe handles them and we hold only the reference.
We do not keep prompts or completions in our database or logs. If you ask for response caching (cache: {"ttl": n}), the reply is held in a cache for the time you request, at most one day, and then expires; nothing is cached unless you ask. The per-request record holds the model slug, the provider that served it, token counts in and out, cache read and write counts, what was charged, what the savings engine removed, whether the cache served it, latency, HTTP status and finish reason. There is no column for the text of a request, so there is nothing there to disclose, subpoena or leak.
Application logs follow the same rule: where a body would be logged, we log a keyed fingerprint — an HMAC-SHA-256 under a secret held only by JetRouter — plus counts of the entity types detected, never the text itself.
The distinction matters and we changed it deliberately. A plain SHA-256 of a Hong Kong ID card number is not anonymous: there are 52 million valid HKIDs, 100 million eight-digit phone numbers and roughly 36,500 plausible dates of birth, so anyone holding the digest can hash the whole list and read the value back. Nothing is broken in the hash; the space is simply small. Because the fingerprint is keyed, that list cannot be tested without the secret, and it is used only to tell whether the same value appeared twice.
The provider that serves your call does receive the request. Their retention is theirs. Every request runs on JetRouter’s provider accounts, under our agreement with each provider, and we send a zero-data-retention flag to the two providers whose APIs accept one — OpenAI (store false) and OpenRouter (data_collection deny) — and for every other provider in the catalog we send nothing and hold no retention agreement. Your evidence export states, per request, which of the three applied: a flag we enforced, a published policy we have recorded but do not transmit or verify, or nothing recorded at all. Most of the catalog is the third.
Each key carries a personal-data mode, which you choose:
The egress gate is part of tokenising, not a backstop under the other two modes. Under Off nothing runs, and under Warn the prompt is deliberately forwarded unchanged — that is what those modes are. Under Warn and Tokenise alike, if detection or the vault is unavailable the request is refused rather than forwarded.
These are deliberate boundaries, reviewed and documented, and we would rather you read them here than discover one.
X-JetRouter-PII-Capability header saying what applied to that one request. Under the schools profile, whose guarantee depends on those classes, the request is refused instead./jetrouter/v1/audio/speech detects personal data, returns the counts and speaks the text as written. It is the one path on which raw personal data reaches a provider by design; it is configuration-gated, it is audited, and your activity log marks every request it applied to.Security-relevant events are written to a hash-chained audit log, so a removed or altered row is detectable. Events carry identifiers, outcomes and entity-type counts — not content. Accounts with evidence export enabled can export their own tenant’s audit evidence from Settings; the export is scoped to your tenant and cannot reach another.
Our systems run in Hong Kong. Model providers are largely outside Hong Kong, so routing a request transfers its content to the provider’s jurisdiction — most often the United States or the European Union. If that matters for a given workload, a tokenising key removes the classes it covers from what crosses the border — read the section above for the ones it does not.
Account and key records: for as long as the account is open, then 90 days. Per-request metadata: 24 months, which is what usage questions and margin reconciliation need. Ledger rows and audit events: 7 years, because they are financial and security records. Vault token maps: for the configured token lifetime only, after which the mapping is gone and a restore is impossible.
Closing an account does not erase the ledger or the audit chain — those are the record of what you were charged and of what happened.
Under the PDPO you may ask for a copy of the personal data we hold about you, ask us to correct it, and ask how it is used. Write to [email protected] and we will answer within 40 days, as the Ordinance requires.
Some data cannot be deleted on request — see retention above — and we will say so plainly rather than accept a request we cannot honour.